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Abstract 
Most common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas share two features: they evolve over time and they 
are managed under environmental uncertainties. We propose a finite-horizon, stochastic, 
dynamic model that integrates these two dimensions. A distinguishing feature of our model is 
that the duration of the game is determined endogenously by the players’ collective decisions. In 
the proposed model, if the resource stock level below which the irreversible event occurs is 
known in advance, then the optimal resource use coincides with a unique symmetric equilibrium 
that guarantees survival of the resource. As the uncertainty about the threshold level increases, 
resource use increases if users adopt decision strategies that quickly deplete the resource stock; 
however, resource use decreases if they adopt path strategies guaranteeing that the unknown 
threshold level is never exceeded. Our experimental results show that CPR users frequently 
implement decision strategies that terminate the game immediately. When the uncertainty about 
the resource level is reduced, users maintain a positive resource level for a longer duration. 
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1. Introduction 
Most natural common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas share two features: they evolve over time 
and they are managed under environmental uncertainties. While each of these two features has 
been analyzed separately in the experimental literature, no attempt has been made to integrate 
them. In particular, the analysis of strategic behavior in the face of environmental uncertainty 
about the size of the CPR has been conducted under the assumption of single-period interaction, 
and the analysis of strategic behavior in time-dependent settings has ignored environmental 
uncertainties. 
The bulk of the experimental literature (e.g., Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) has 
analyzed unrestricted resource-use decisions by placing subjects in the context of repeated time-
independent CPR dilemmas characterized only by strategic uncertainty about the planned 
behavior of others. A major finding is aggregate behavior consistent with the theoretically 
predicted resource misallocations (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968). It has been noted, however, that 
while the time-independent framework may be an adequate representation of CPRs characterized 
by flows, in which availability of the resource in the future is independent of current requests, it 
fails to capture the important temporal feature of stock resources, like groundwater systems, 
fisheries, forests, etc. (Brown 2001). In these instances, decisions concerning resource-use are 
typically made in the “shadow of the future” in the sense that current requests from the resource 
pool compete with resource availability in the future. 
It is a priori unclear if the presence of such temporal factors would elicit behavior 
different from that observed in time-independent settings. Because current requests not only 
affect the future profits of other group members, but also their individual profits as well, CPR 
users may adopt precautionary strategies that lead them closer to Pareto optimal outcomes. For 
example, Reinganum and Stokey (1985) show that efficient resource-use decisions are to be 
expected in time-dependent settings when users can jointly commit to “path” strategies over the 
entire planning horizon. On the other hand, the consideration that current request decisions affect 
future request possibilities also raises a dynamic optimization problem that complicates the 
attainment of Pareto optimal outcomes even in single-agent contexts (Messick and McClelland 
1983; Hey, Neugebauer and Sadrieh 2009). Moreover, as shown by Dutta (1995), the standard 
intuition from infinitely repeated time-independent games, whereby Pareto optimal outcomes can 
be sustained in equilibrium through threat of credible punishment by patient players, does not 
necessarily carry over to time-dependent games with stock variables. In these games, players’ 
payoffs depend not only on current and previous periods’ decisions, but also on state variables 
that change from period to period. Theoretically, this renders tacit agreements on Pareto optimal 
paths much more difficult to attain than in purely repeated frameworks. 
Seminal experimental investigations placing subjects in time-dependent CPR contexts 
have been conducted by Herr, Gardner, and Walker (1997) and Mason and Philips (1997). Herr 
et al. (1997) considered the effect of increasing exploitation costs at a predetermined fixed rate 
from period to period in a 10-period supergame. They concluded that subjects did not internalize 
the future increased costs, and that behavior in the time-dependent setting intensified the race for 
resources relative to time-independent settings. Although current decisions in this study affected 
future exploitation costs, an effect on the size of the resource stock was not considered. Mason 
and Philips (1997) considered an infinite time horizon supergame in which subjects were given 
an initial stock, and request strategies endogenously determined the stock size (and exploitation 
costs) thereafter. They concluded that lack of cooperative behavior is exacerbated when time-
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dependency is included in CPR dilemmas. Osés-Eraso, Udina, and Viladrich-Grau (2008) have 
modified this game by implementing a more realistic finite horizon supergame and allowing for 
early extinction of the stock as a function of cumulative group requests. Exogenously 
manipulating the initial stock size (scarce or abundant), they found that early extinction of the 
resource occurs irrespective of the initial scarcity condition and costs.  
Although Osés-Eraso et al. (2008), and one of the experimental conditions in Mason and 
Philips (1997), allowed for extinction of the resource stock as a function of the cumulative 
requests, they excluded the possibility for more complex resource dynamics involving threshold 
effects and sudden changes in the resource state. The only study that partially addressed this 
possibility experimentally was Gardner and Walker (1992). They implemented a 20-period 
supergame in which resource extinction (end of the game) could occur within a given period 
with an endogenously determined probability modeled as an increasing function of total group 
requests. In this model, the critical threshold stock level triggering the catastrophic event was 
known in advance, but subjects were unable to avoid the damage, and the resource was quickly 
destroyed with a median duration of six periods. However, the model does not capture the effects 
of the lack of precise information regarding the size and growth of natural resources, which 
characterizes most real-world commons. The conditions that trigger an irreversible event are 
often imperfectly known, or are affected by stochastic environmental conditions outside CPR 
users’ control, rendering the critical threshold stock level unknown a priori. 
Experimental assessments of the impacts of environmental uncertainty on group requests 
from a CPR have mainly been conducted by Rapoport and co-authors (Rapoport and Suleiman, 
1992; Rapoport, Budescu, Suleiman, and Weg 1992; and Budescu, Rapoport, and Suleiman 
1995) in the context of repeated single-trial experiments. In their experiments, subjects could 
request resources from pools whose parameters were randomly selected from a set of commonly 
known uniform probability distributions. Using mean-preserving spreads to capture increasing 
levels of uncertainty regarding the resource size, these experiments have demonstrated that 
increased uncertainty causes subjects to request more from the shared resource. Along with the 
observed uncertainty effect, Rapoport and co-authors have provided several explanations for its 
occurrence. One explanation posits that subjects perceive the central tendency of a probability 
distribution and its variability to be positively correlated. Thus, as the uncertainty increases, 
subjects’ estimates of the mean value of the resource size increases, prompting them to request 
more. Another explanation, in line with an “outcome desirability bias” (Gustafsson, Biel, and 
Garling 1999), posits that subjects overweight the most desired upper bound of the possible 
resource size. This, again, prompts subjects to request more of the resource as the uncertainty 
increases in mean-preserving resource distributions. Despite the merits of these explanations, the 
literature seems to have overlooked that the observed relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and individual requests pertains to single-trial experiments. Under these 
circumstances, a significant restraint in individual requests by the group members that can be 
considered cooperative behavior may not yield the highest collective payoffs as it may constitute 
resource under-use from an economically efficient perspective. Indeed, increased requests as a 
response to an increase in environmental uncertainty levels in time-independent settings 
conforms to Pareto-efficient solutions, and not just Nash behavior. This observation, however, is 
unlikely to be true in time-dependent settings. A number of theoretical articles on various 
resource management problems, including intrusion of saltwater in coastal aquifers (Tsur and 
Zemel 1995), forest fires (Yin and Newman 1996), and pollution-related events (Clarke and 
Reed 1994), have generally established that efficient solutions for the dynamic management of 
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resources under uncertain critical threshold levels require more prudence and conservative 
behavior than those under conditions of certainty. Thus, whether or not the positive relationship 
between environmental uncertainty and request behavior from a shared resource is likely to be 
observed in a time-dependent laboratory setting, in which both considerations of individual 
future payoffs and efficient solutions require more conservative requests, is still an open 
empirical question. 
The present paper addresses this question by developing and experimentally testing a 
dynamic stochastic game-theoretic model integrating the effects of environmental uncertainty in 
time-dependent CPR dilemmas. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model 
and solves it for general theoretical benchmarks. Section 3 outlines the experimental design and 
presents the theoretical predictions that are later used as benchmarks for the analysis of the 
experimental data. Section 4 reports the results of the experiment, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Dynamic-stochastic CPR game 
We develop a dynamic-stochastic game-theoretic model of the appropriation of a CPR by non-
cooperative players under conditions of environmental uncertainty. The game involves a fixed 
set of n players who play a stage game Γt in each period t, where an upper bound T to the length 
of the game is common knowledge, and earnings accumulate through the course of play. 
However, in contrast to purely dynamic time-dependent games with no uncertainty in the 
evolution of the game environment (Dutta 1995), the particular game to be faced by the players 
at time t in the present setup is randomly selected from a commonly known finite set of games, 
thereby falling in the category of stochastic games (Shapley 1953; Sobel 1971). In addition, in 
order to capture the effects of environmental uncertainty on the CPR dilemma, players do not 
know which game has been selected when the game at time t is to be played. 
Each of the stage games Γt that make up the dynamic game is drawn from Suleiman and 
Rapoport (1988). In each stage game Γt, a group of n players decide simultaneously and 
anonymously on how much to request from a shared resource (CPR) whose precise size is 
unknown. However, it is commonly known that the resource size, denoted by St, is uniformly 
distributed on the [, ] closed interval. Each of the n individuals may request anything between 
0 and  from the shared resource, and after the requests are made, the precise size of the resource 
is publicly announced, corresponding to the random realization st of St. Thus, the precise value of 
st corresponds to the particular stage game Γt randomly selected by “nature” at time t. 
Furthermore, if the sum of group requests is smaller than or equal to st, then each individual 
keeps his or her own requests. On the other hand, if the sum of group requests exceeds the size st 
of the resource, then each individual’s payoff is zero. 
Assuming linear utility functions for all players, and letting rjt stand for the request made 
by player j on trial t, the expected payoff to the player in stage game Γt is given by 
    {
                                                              ∑    
 
     
        (∑    
 
      )            ∑    
 
     
                                                              ∑    
 
     
    (1) 
where ∑    
 
    is the sum of group requests in stage game Γt, and     (∑    
 
      )     
∑    
 
          . 
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We introduce structural time dependence in this model through the definition of transition 
probabilities governing how the game proceeds from period t to period t+1, which we condition 
on the actual game Γt played in period t as randomly selected by “nature,” and on the actions 
chosen by the players in period t. Specifically, if the aggregate requests are smaller than or equal 
to the resource size at time t, then the game continues to period t+1. If the aggregate requests are 
infeasible, in the sense that they exceed the resource size at time t, then the game terminates. 
Formally, the continuation probability from period t to period t+1 is given by: 
   
{
 
 
                               ∑    
 
     
  ∑    
 
   
   
            ∑    
 
      
                                ∑    
 
      
      (2) 
In other words, if the group request is below a minimum pre-determined quantity , the 
game continues to a subsequent period with certainty, implying an economically unchanged 
resource size between the periods. If the group request exceeds the randomly determined 
resource size, then the resource is degraded and the game is terminated. If the group request 
belongs to this interval of quantities, the game continues to a subsequent period with a positive 
probability corresponding to the ex-ante probability that the group request does not exceed the 
resource size. Thus, while players may request resources over a predetermined and commonly 
known time horizon, a distinguishing feature of this model is that the precise duration of the 
game is determined endogenously by the players whose collective decisions determine the 
probability of an irreversible environmental event. In addition, the model captures those 
circumstances characterized by both pool-size uncertainty and regeneration-rate uncertainty, 
features that are present in many real-world commons (Hine and Gifford 1996). In particular, 
when group requests exceed  but the resource is not depleted, the inter-temporal effect of group 
requests may be interpreted as captured by a stochastic regeneration rate gt applied to end of 
period remaining stock,    ∑    
 
   . The parameter gt determines the stock available in the 
subsequent period,          ∑    
 
      , where gt is uniformly distributed with limits 
endogenously determined by group requests and the stochastic resource size,        
∑    
 
           ∑    
 
     . 
Because the CPR game is composed of interdependent stochastic dynamic programming 
problems, it may be solved by dynamic programming/Bellman’s equation method, and because it 
is symmetric we focus on symmetric outcomes as benchmarks for data analysis. In particular, we 
solve the game for three types of outcomes: the social optimum (joint payoff maximization) 
outcome, the subgame perfect outcome, and a conservative outcome guaranteeing survival of the 
resource over the entire time horizon.  
We first construct the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome, in which 
players are assumed to adopt “decision rule strategies” (Reinganum and Stokey 1985) since they 
cannot credibly commit to future requests. In this context, each player j independently seeks to 
maximize the value of the resource at any time t by choice of request strategy, taking the 
decision rule strategies of all the other players exploiting the resource as given. Assuming no 
discounting of future payoffs, the value of the resource for player j at time t,         , satisfies the 
Bellman equation: 
   (   )              (     )               . (3) 
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The transversality condition for this maximization problem is that the value of the 
resource after the final period T is zero (meaning that players leave behind no resources, or if 
they do those extra resources do not contribute anything to maximized value): 
     (     )   . (4) 
The recursive equation defining player’s j value function at final time T is therefore: 
   (   )     . (5) 
Maximizing    (   ) in the quadratic region of (1) with respect to    , and invoking 
symmetry to write the sum of requests by all the n players excluding player j as          
     , yields the subgame perfect request at time T: 
   
         . (6) 
The value function at time T is then given by (using (6) in (5)): 
   (   
 )                  . (7) 
Similarly, the value function at time T-1 is given by: 
     (     )                (   
 ). (8) 
Maximizing      (     ) with respect to      , and assuming that                   , yields 
the subgame perfect request at time T-1: 
     
                            . (9) 
The value function at time T-1 is then given by (using (9) and (7) in (8)): 
     (     
 )                                       . (10) 
Letting                 , the value function at time T-1 can be re-written as: 
     (     
 )      (   
 )      , (11) 
and the subgame perfect request at time T-1 can be written as: 
     
     
        . (12) 
By mathematical induction, one can show that the equilibrium value function at any time t is 
given by: 
   (   
 )      (   
 )       
                            
 , (13) 
and the subgame perfect request at time t is given by 
   
     
                                   (14) 
where the recursive factor    is given by: 
            
 . (15) 
One starts solving the recursion by noting that (7) can also be written as: 
                    
               , (16) 
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and that using (14) and (15), the equation above can also be written as: 
                                           
                . (17) 
Solving (17) with respect to      yields: 
         . (18) 
The value of      in (18) can then be substituted into (15) to get   , and working backward from 
there to the first period at time t=1. 
Note, however, that the solution in (14) does not constitute the subgame perfect 
equilibrium request in all cases. At any time t, if            , any vector of requests   
  
               , whose elements satisfy the condition ∑    
  
     ,      , is also an 
equilibrium solution whereby the group ensures a continuation probability equal to one. 
Assuming a symmetrical solution, the result following this condition can be written as: 
   
     . (19) 
The subgame perfect request at any time t in all cases is then given by: 
   
                                 . (20) 
 
Moving next from the equilibrium solution to joint payoff maximization, the social 
optimum path can be constructed by applying dynamic programming to (3) under the assumption 
that only a single agent is in charge of the resource. The social optimum request by player j at 
any time t in all cases is then given by: 
   
                               , (21) 
where           ,             
 , and          . 
 
Comparison of equations (20) and (21) reveals that the subgame perfect path involves 
higher requests than the social optimum path as long as          , rendering the decision 
rule strategies Pareto deficient for levels of uncertainty beyond a relatively small threshold level. 
In turn, the social optimum path only guarantees the survival of the resource over the entire time 
horizon for moderate levels of uncertainty, that is, as long as     . Beyond this level of 
uncertainty, survival of the resource over the entire time horizon could only be attained by the 
adoption of “path” strategies requiring each player to commit to a “conservative” request equal 
to     at each stage of the game. 
 
3. Experimental design and theoretical predictions 
A. Procedures, parameters and treatments 
We designed a simple experiment operationalizing the game described by equations (1) and (2) 
with groups composed of six (n=6) subjects and a time horizon of ten periods (T=10). Each 
subject participated in thirty repetitions of the same dynamic game. Prior to the first game, each 
subject was randomly and anonymously assigned to a fixed group for the duration of a session. 
We implemented two mean-preserving uncertainty conditions in a between-subject design. In 
one of the uncertainty conditions (hereinafter, “high” uncertainty condition), the commonly 
known resource size was uniformly distributed on the [150, 850] closed interval, for an 
uncertainty range of 700 and an expected value of 500. Subjects were provided with written 
instructions informing them that they could, individually, request from 0 up to 850 tokens, and 
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that the precise value of the resource (called “random draw”) in any period was to be randomly 
extracted (and announced) after all group members made their requests. They were also informed 
that if the sum of group requests were larger than the randomly determined resource size in any 
period, then their individual payoffs in that period would be zero, and the game would be 
terminated; otherwise, their individual payoffs in that period would equal their individual 
requests, and the game would continue to a subsequent period unless the game had reached the 
final period. Specifically, subjects were informed that the game would be terminated either if the 
sum of the group requests exceeded the value of the resource or after 10 periods, whichever 
came first. In addition to a $5 participation fee, at the end of the session subjects were paid for 
the tokens accumulated in four (randomly determined for each subject) out of the thirty 
repetitions, in which each token was worth 2 cents. This procedure was implemented to prevent 
wealth effects. The exact same procedures were used to implement a second uncertainty 
condition (hereinafter, “low” uncertainty condition) in which the commonly known resource size 
was uniformly distributed on the [270, 730] closed interval, for a smaller uncertainty range of 
460 and the same expected value of 500. In each condition, the sessions lasted for about two 
hours. 
The experiment was implemented using the z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) software. No 
communication between the subjects was allowed. All experimental sessions were conducted at 
the Behavioral Research Lab of the School of Business Administration at the University of 
California, Riverside, which is a standard computerized laboratory with subjects’ stations placed 
in separate “cubicles” ensuring privacy. Subjects were recruited from the pool of UCR students 
registered to participate in research studies through the web-based subject recruitment system 
available at UCR, ensuring that no subject had participated in a similar experiment before. A 
total of 114 subjects participated in this experiment, 60 of them in the high uncertainty condition 
(10 different groups) and 54 of them in the low uncertainty condition (9 different groups). 
B. Theoretical predictions 
We present the theoretical predictions that are used as benchmarks for the analysis of the data 
from the two treatments. The top panel in Table 1 shows the dynamic programming paths for the 
high uncertainty condition. If players follow a conservative path (not shown in the Table), the 
symmetric individual request (r) is 25 tokens in each period of the game, for a total group request 
(R) of 150 each period of the game. The overall payoff across the 10 periods of the game () for 
each player is, therefore, 25×10=250 tokens. Next, consider the social optimum (SO) path 
displayed in Table 1 (top panel). In the last period of the game, when only a single period 
remains to the end of the game, the optimal solution is an individual request of 71. The 
probability of receiving this request (p) is about 0.61, yielding an expected payoff of  = 43 
tokens. If only two periods remain, the optimal solution is an individual request of 49. The 
probability of receiving this request is about 0.79. The individual’s expected payoff across these 
two periods is, therefore, 49×0.79+0.79×43=73 tokens. Working backwards in this fashion, the 
individual’s expected payoff across the 10 periods of the game from following the social 
optimum path is equal to 274 tokens, the value of  shown in Table 1 when ten periods are 
remaining (i.e., at the beginning of the game). This corresponds to the maximum symmetric 
expected payoffs that subjects may achieve in this game. Comparing the expected payoffs from 
following a conservative path to the social optimum path yields an efficiency index of 
(250/274)×100=91% for the conservative path. This means that subjects are expected to achieve 
91 percent of the maximum expected payoffs that may be achieved in this game if they follow a 
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conservative path. The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE) path shown in Table 1 is 
constructed in the same manner, considering the predicted (symmetric) Nash equilibrium 
requests by each player. In this case, the individual’s expected payoff across the ten periods of 
the game from following this path is 31 tokens, yielding a meager efficiency index of only about 
11%. 
The bottom panel in Table 1 shows the dynamic programming paths for the low-
uncertainty condition. If players follow a conservative path in this condition, the symmetric 
individual request is 45 tokens in each period of the game, for a total group request of 270 each 
period of the game. The overall payoff across the 10 periods of the game for each player is 
45×10=450 tokens. The individual’s expected payoff across the 10 periods of the game from 
following the social optimum path is 453 tokens, and is 44 tokens from following the subgame 
perfect equilibrium path. In this case, the subgame perfect path yields an efficiency index of 
about 10 percent. 
Comparison of the upper and lower parts of Table 1 shows that, as might be expected, 
payoffs increase under all three benchmarks as the uncertainty about the size of the resource 
decreases. Table 1 shows that each of these two uncertainty conditions yields different 
predictions concerning players’ requests from the shared resource, with the social optimum path 
entailing substantially lower requests than the respective subgame perfect path. Therefore, the 
subgame perfect paths are Pareto deficient in both of the uncertainty conditions implemented in 
the laboratory. Importantly, the efficiency index of the subgame perfect path is maintained 
approximately equal in both uncertainty conditions, so that the incentives for any cooperative 
behavior do not differ much between the two conditions. Moreover, any increase in the requests 
that might be observed in response to an increase in the uncertainty levels cannot simultaneously 
make part of a competitive (subgame perfect) and a cooperative (conservative or social 
optimum) path. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, while the increased uncertainty in the high 
uncertainty condition elicits higher requests than in the low condition, if subjects follow the 
subgame perfect path, it overall elicits significantly lower requests than in the low-uncertainty 
condition, if subjects follow a conservative path or the social optimum path. 
4. Experimental results 
Our analysis of the experimental data focuses on the effects of environmental uncertainty on 
resource-use decisions at the group level. We organize the analysis of group behavior by 
examining in order: (A) behavior in the high uncertainty condition, (B) behavior in the low 
uncertainty condition, and (C) comparison of the behavior across the two uncertainty conditions.
2
 
In each case, the main results are presented in the form of summary observations. 
 
                                                          
2
 Because subjects participated in 30 repetitions/series of the same dynamic game, we first investigated whether play 
of the games changed as subjects gained experience. The general finding in purely repeated CPR games is that 
behavior is consistent with efficient outcomes in the first rounds of play, and approaches the equilibrium prediction 
in the last rounds. Under this pattern of behavior, we would expect to observe longer games in the first series of 
play, and shorter games as the series approach the end. The figure in the Appendix plots the maximum number of 
periods played by each group in each of the games, where the title in each of the panels identifies the uncertainty 
condition. In each case, the figure suggests that there is no systematic association between the length of the games 
and order of play. This impression was confirmed by several statistical analyses (available from the authors). 
Therefore, we pool the data across the games for the statistical analysis of the data in both uncertainty conditions. 
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A. High-uncertainty condition 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the main results of the high-uncertainty condition. Table 2 presents 
the length of the games played by each group. Pooling across all 10 groups, the median length of 
the games is one period, with three of the 10 groups registering a median length of two periods. 
Clearly, none of the groups adopted a conservative path, and depletion of the resource stock 
occurred rather quickly. 
Figure 1 depicts the probability of resource destruction as implied by the social optimum 
and equilibrium paths (broken lines) along with the observed proportions. Using the predictions 
in the top panel of Table 1, the probability of resource destruction prior to period eight is 0 
percent at the social optimum path, increasing to 8 percent ((1-0.92)×100) prior to period nine 
and to 27% ((1-0.92×0.79)×100) prior to period 10. In the context of dynamic games, theory tells 
us that we should observe an immediate depletion of the resource stock if groups are unable or 
unwilling to make commitments about future extraction rates (Reinganum and Stokey 1985), 
corresponding to the assumption that behavior is guided by decision rule strategies underlying 
the predicted SPNE path. In fact, as implied by the numbers in Table 1, the probability of 
resource destruction prior to period two is 79 percent ((1-0.21)×100) at the equilibrium path, 
increasing to 96 percent ((1-0.21×0.21)×100) prior to period three, and reaching about 100 
percent in subsequent periods. With such high destruction probabilities, the chance of observing 
games lasting for more than a single period in the data is quite small if subjects do not deviate 
from the predicted equilibrium path. As Figure 1 reveals, despite the variability of group 
behavior, the rates of resource destruction are quite above those predicted by the social optimum 
path, and closer to the equilibrium path. 
Table 3 shows that group requests terminating the game immediately, which accounted 
for about 55 percent of the data, average 688 tokens. This mean compares closely to the 
equilibrium prediction of 702 tokens. As expected, first-period requests are negatively associated 
with the length of the game. The average first-period group requests for games longer than one 
period, which account for 45 percent of the data, is 487 tokens. These requests are in between the 
efficient and the equilibrium values. 
Using Wald tests while adjusting standard errors for clustering at the group level, the 
signed mean differences between the observed first-period group requests (R
Obs
) and the 
equilibrium (R
SPNE
) and efficient (R
SO
) values were tested for statistical significance. The results 
are summarized in Table 4. They show that group requests in games terminated in the first period 
(Length=1) are not significantly different from the predicted equilibrium value. The mean 
estimated difference between R
Obs
 and R
SPNE
 is about -14 tokens; it is not significantly different 
from zero at conventional significance levels using the Wald statistics. The mean differences 
between first-period group requests and predicted equilibrium and efficient values are both 
significantly different from zero for games lasting for more than one period (Length>1). Mean 
group requests are 214 tokens below the equilibrium value, and 337 tokens above the efficient 
value. In order to evaluate whether the observed deviations from equilibrium requests are larger 
or smaller than the observed deviations from efficient requests, the delta method (Oehlert 1992) 
was used to calculate the standard error and 95 percent confidence interval of the absolute value 
of the ratio of the estimated difference between observed requests and the respective equilibrium 
and efficient requests (∆). The confidence interval for the ratio is [0.4; 0.9]. It indicates that the 
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observed deviations from equilibrium requests are smaller than the observed deviations from 
efficient requests. 
To complement the analysis of group behavior, we computed the per-period mean square 
deviation (MSD) of requests from predicted requests (either SPNE or SO) for each group in each 
of the 30 played games. For each group separately, Table 5 indicates the number of games in 
which the MSD from the SPNE path is smaller than the MSD from the SO path. Also reported in 
the table are the binomial probabilities associated with the observed number of games under the 
null hypothesis that it is equally likely for either of the two predicted paths to result in the 
smaller MSD in any given game. The results show that the SPNE path is the best predictor of 
behavior for eight of the 10 groups, and that for two of the groups we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that both paths are equally likely at a significance level of 5 percent. Defining success 
as an observation in which the SPNE path is the best predictor of group behavior, the probability 
of observing 8 or more groups following the SPNE path is 0.003 under the null hypothesis that 
the three events (SPNE, SO, or both) are equally likely. For any one-tailed significance level 
lower than 5 percent, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the 
SPNE path is the overall best predictor of behavior for the groups in this uncertainty condition. 
Taken together, these findings are summarized in the following observation. 
Observation 1. Groups in the high-uncertainty condition adopt decision strategies that 
quickly deplete the resource stock. Group requests are uniformly closer to the SPNE path than to 
the SO path. 
B. Low-uncertainty condition 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the main results in the low-uncertainty condition. The median length 
of the games in the low-uncertainty treatment across all groups is two periods, with four of the 
nine groups (44 percent) registering a median length of one period. It is twice as large as the 
same median in the high-uncertainty condition. Again, none of the groups adopted a conservative 
path, with depletion of the resource stock occurring rather quickly. 
Figure 2 depicts the probability of resource destruction as implied by the SO and SPNE 
paths, along with the observed proportions. Although the destruction probability curves are more 
dispersed than in Figure 1, they are closer to the SPNE than the SO path. 
Table 7 shows that group requests terminating the game immediately, which accounted 
for about 46% of the data, average 569. This mean request compares closely to the equilibrium 
prediction of 588 tokens. The mean first-period group requests for games longer than one period 
is 412 tokens. These requests are in between the efficient and the equilibrium values. 
Table 8 addresses the issue of whether first-period requests are significantly different 
from the SPNE and SO paths. In games terminating in the first period, the mean difference 
between R
Obs
 and R
SPNE
 is -19 tokens; the null hypothesis of zero difference could not be rejected 
by the Wald test at conventional significance levels. The mean differences between first-period 
group requests and predicted equilibrium and efficient values are both significantly different 
from zero for games lasting for more than one period (Length>1). Mean group requests are 177 
tokens below the equilibrium value, and 142 tokens above the efficient value. Although the 
absolute value of the ratio of these two differences is greater than 1, suggesting that the distance 
between observed requests and the SPNE prediction is larger than the distance between observed 
requests and the SO prediction, the computed confidence interval for the ratio is [0.7; 1.8]. Thus, 
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at the 5 percent significance level, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the observed deviations 
from the SPNE path are equal to the observed deviations from the SO path. 
Table 9 addresses the issue of whether groups’ behavior is better described by the SPNE 
or the SO path. The results show that the SPNE path is the best predictor of behavior for four of 
the nine groups. The SO path is the best predictor of behavior for two other groups, and the 
results of the testing procedure are inconclusive for the remaining three groups. Defining success 
as an observation in which the SPNE path is the best predictor of group behavior, the probability 
of observing four or more groups following the SPNE path is 0.35 under the null hypothesis that 
the three events (SPNE, SO, or both) are equally likely. Therefore, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis at conventional significance levels. 
We summarize these findings in the following observation. 
Observation 2. Groups in the low-uncertainty condition tend to adopt decision strategies 
that quickly deplete the resource stock. However, the SPNE path is not uniformly the best 
predictor of group requests, with some groups adopting behavior closer to the SO path and other 
groups adopting behavior falling in between these two polar cases. 
C. Comparing uncertainty conditions 
We would expect higher uncertainty about the size of the resource to elicit higher group requests, 
if groups adopt decision strategies, but to elicit lower group requests, if groups adopt path 
strategies leading to perfectly efficient outcomes. As seen above (Tables 3 and 7), and consistent 
with the adoption of decision strategies, group requests are higher in the high-uncertainty 
condition than in the low-uncertainty condition. Given that the same differences in requests 
generate different probabilities of resource destruction across different manipulations of 
uncertainty ranges, a general assessment of the effects of increased uncertainty is better 
accomplished by analyzing the implied differences in destruction probabilities rather than by 
analyzing the differences in requests observed across the different manipulations of uncertainty 
ranges. 
Panels A and B in Table 10 report the estimated effects of the higher-uncertainty level on 
the implied probabilities of resource destruction by first-period requests. For completeness, also 
reported in Table 10 (panel C) is the estimated effect implied by all non-first-period requests. 
Given that the dependent variable is naturally bounded between 0 and 1, the estimation of 
treatment effects uses the specification developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for 
fractional-dependent variables. In addition, because the conditional expectation function in the 
specification used is nonlinear (so as to generate predictions naturally bounded between 0 and 1), 
the estimated parameter value associated with the treatment variable does not directly measure 
the treatment effect on the mean value of the dependent variable. Thus, to aid in interpretation, 
the coefficient estimates reported in Table 10 are the marginal effects of a discrete change in 
explanatory variable HIGH taking the unit value for the high-uncertainty condition and the zero 
value for the low-uncertainty condition. 
Table 10 shows that the implied probabilities of destruction induced by the higher request 
in the high-uncertainty condition are significantly higher than the probabilities of destruction 
observed in the low-uncertainty condition. Considering only the subset of games terminated in 
the first period, the probabilities of destruction are, on average, 12 percentage points higher in 
the high than the low-uncertainty condition. Moreover, the width of the 95 percent confidence 
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interval indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the difference in destruction 
probabilities between the two treatments is 10 percentage points, corresponding to the predicted 
difference generated by the SPNE paths. This result is not particularly surprising, given that 
group requests in both treatments are consistent with the respective SPNE paths for this subset of 
the data. 
Considering only the first-period requests in the subset of games lasting for more than 
one period, the difference in destruction probabilities between the treatments is 17 percentage 
points, significantly higher than the predicted difference by the SPNE paths. Because first-period 
requests in games terminated after the first period are lower than the predicted SPNE values in 
both treatments, it could still be the case that the difference in the implied destruction 
probabilities remained at about the 10 percentage points, generated by the respective SPNE 
paths. Clearly, this is not the case, suggesting that reducing uncertainty levels positively impacts 
resource conservation beyond what would be predicted by common inability of the groups to 
commit to future extraction rates (i.e., by behavior consistent with the SPNE path). 
This observation is further corroborated by the results in Panel C, considering only the 
subset of all non-first requests in both treatments. Had groups approximated their requests to the 
SPNE paths after the first period of the game, the mean differences in destruction probabilities 
between the treatments would be 8.5 percentage points, since the difference declines 
systematically as the game evolves. Consistent with this pattern of behavior, we observe lower 
differences in destruction probabilities between the treatments in subsequent periods. However, 
as indicated by the 95 percent confidence interval, the difference is again significantly higher 
than would be predicted by groups approximating their respective SPNE paths. 
Coupled with those summarized in Observations 1 and 2 above, these findings indicate 
not only that treatment effects cannot solely be attributed to Nash behavior, but also that it is 
groups’ behavior in the low-uncertainty condition that explains the differential treatment effect 
with respect to equilibrium predictions. 
These findings are summarized in the following observation. 
Observation 3. Compared with the high-uncertainty condition, the low-uncertainty 
condition elicits lower requests from the shared resource. Moreover, it also induces a qualitative 
change in groups’ behavior in the sense that it positively impacts resource conservation beyond 
what would be predicted by groups adopting decision rule strategies under both conditions. 
5. Conclusion 
The dynamic stochastic game-theoretic model proposed in this paper focuses on the effects of 
environmental uncertainty in time-dependent CPR dilemmas. While CPR users may extract 
resources over a predetermined and commonly known time horizon, a distinguishing feature of 
our model is that the duration of the game is determined endogenously by the players whose 
collective decisions determine the probability of an irreversible environmental outcome. The 
abrupt intrusion of salt water in coastal aquifers once the groundwater table declines below an 
unknown threshold level is an example of such an event. In the present model, if the resource 
stock level below which the irreversible outcome occurs is known in advance, then the optimal 
resource use coincides with a unique symmetric equilibrium use guaranteeing survival of the 
resource over the finite horizon. As the uncertainty about an otherwise equally expected 
threshold level increases, resource use increases if users adopt decision strategies that quickly 
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deplete the resource stock. Resource use decreases if users adopt path strategies guaranteeing 
that the unknown threshold level is never exceeded over the entire horizon. 
In an experiment that manipulates the common uncertainty about the threshold resource 
level, we find that CPR users implement decision strategies that terminate the game immediately. 
Notwithstanding, reducing the uncertainty about the resource level induces a qualitative change 
in behavior with users more frequently maintaining a positive resource level for a longer 
duration. If replicated and extended, these results have potentially important theoretical and 
policy implications. At the theoretical level, they suggest decision strategies that CPR users may 
use when they may not make credible commitments. At the policy level, these results provide 
evidence that the reduction of environmental uncertainty by creating and disseminating better 
scientific information may play a major role in long-range planning to elicit synergy between the 
economic and ecological systems that jointly govern the dynamic management of shared natural 
resources. Estimated as the difference between the high- and the low-uncertainty outcomes, the 
value of this information is an indicator to the policy maker about how much to invest in 
acquiring and disseminating information to the user that reduces uncertainty about the CPR. 
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Table 1 – Dynamic programming paths for high- and low-uncertainty conditions 
Time 
Remaining 
Social optimum (SO) path  Subgame perfect (SPNE) path 
R r p   R r p  
A. High uncertainty condition: n=6, =150, =850, Expected Value=500, Range=700 
1 425 71 0.61 43  729 121 0.17 21 
2 296 49 0.79 73  711 118 0.20 28 
3 206 34 0.92 99  705 117 0.21 30 
4 150 25 1.00 124  703 117 0.21 31 
5 150 25 1.00 149  702 117 0.21 31 
6 150 25 1.00 174  702 117 0.21 31 
7 150 25 1.00 199  702 117 0.21 31 
8 150 25 1.00 224  702 117 0.21 31 
9 150 25 1.00 249  702 117 0.21 31 
10 150 25 1.00 274  702 117 0.21 31 
          
Efficiency 
Index (%) 
   100     11 
 
B. Low-uncertainty condition: n=6, =270, =730, Expected Value=500, Range=460 
1 365 61 0.79 48  626 104 0.23 24 
2 270 45 1.00 93  605 101 0.27 34 
3 270 45 1.00 138  597 99 0.29 39 
4 270 45 1.00 183  593 99 0.30 41 
5 270 45 1.00 228  591 98 0.30 42 
6 270 45 1.00 273  589 98 0.31 43 
7 270 45 1.00 318  589 98 0.31 43 
8 270 45 1.00 363  589 98 0.31 43 
9 270 45 1.00 408  588 98 0.31 44 
10 270 45 1.00 453  588 98 0.31 44 
          
Efficiency 
Index (%) 
   100     10 
Note: R is total group request; r is individual (symmetric) request; p is the probability of receiving the request and 
continuing the game;  is individual expected payoff from conforming to the paths described. Adoption of a 
conservative strategy yields an efficiency index of 91% (25×10=250/274) in the high uncertainty condition, and an 
efficiency index of 99% (45×10=450/453) in the low-uncertainty condition. 
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Table 2 – Number of games played by group (Gi) and length of game: High-uncertainty 
condition 
Length G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10 Total 
1 11 20 19 19 12 10 20 20 16 17 164 
2 6 6 5 6 6 7 9 6 5 5 61 
3 5 3 4 2 7 6 1 3 5 4 40 
4 3 1 2 2 2 5 0 1 2 1 19 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
6 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 5 
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 4 
8 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Median 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Mean 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 
SD 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 
 
 
Table 3 – Per period mean group requests by period and length of game: High-uncertainty 
condition 
Length 
of 
game 
Period within the game 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 688 
(219) 
         
2 549 
(139) 
589 
(174) 
     
 
  
3 435 
(103) 
442 
(75) 
495 
(160) 
    
 
  
4 459 
(102) 
468 
(76) 
421 
(89) 
432 
(77) 
    
  
5 375 
(0) 
375 
(0) 
400 
(0) 
325 
(0) 
325 
(0) 
   
  
6 427 
(53) 
398 
(73) 
366 
(46) 
387 
(76) 
357 
(52) 
564 
(362) 
  
  
7 454 
(58) 
417 
(83) 
349 
(66) 
378 
(33) 
384 
(54) 
366 
(29) 
395 
(23) 
 
  
8 393 
(81) 
369 
(107) 
353 
(74) 
369 
(46) 
403 
(82) 
398 
(84) 
410 
(68) 
458 
(132) 
  
10 395 
(0) 
385 
(0) 
320 
(0) 
337 
(0) 
335 
(0) 
309 
(0) 
343 
(0) 
282 
(0) 
335 
(0) 
277 
(0) 
Note: Standard deviation is in parentheses. Games of length 5 and 10 were only observed once. 
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Table 4 – Statistical analysis of differences between observed and predicted values 
Length 
Games 
Variable Coefficient Wald z 
Statistics 
p-value Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
L
en
g
th
=
1
 R
Obs
-R
SPNE
 -13.757 -0.39 0.699 -83.461 55.947 
R
Obs
-R
SO
 537.854 15.12 0.000 468.150 607.558 
∆=
SOObs
SPNEObs
R-R
R-R
 0.026 0.38 0.706 -0.107 0.158 
L
en
g
th
>
1
 R
Obs
-R
SPNE
 -214.397 -8.37 0.000 -264.601 -164.194 
R
Obs
-R
SO
 337.213 13.16 0.000 287.010 387.417 
∆=
SOObs
SPNEObs
R-R
R-R
 0.636 5.12 0.000 0.392 0.879 
Table 5 – Number of games with smallest MSD from the SPNE path 
Group Nº Games Proportion Hypotheses p-value Decision 
1 17 0.567 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.292 Do not Rej. H0 
2 29 0.967 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
3 27 0.900 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
4 28 0.933 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
5 27 0.900 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
6 17 0.567 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.292 Do not Rej. H0 
7 30 1.000 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
8 29 0.967 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
9 20 0.667 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.05 Rej. H0 
10 21 0.700 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.02 Rej. H0 
Note: The per period mean square deviation (MSD) of requests from predicted requests for each group in each game 
k=1, …, 30, is computed as ∑         
   
  
    
   , where     is the observed group request in period t of game k, 
   
  is the respective prediction (either at the SPNE or SO path), and    is the length of game k. For each group, we 
define a “success” as a game in which the MSD from the SPNE path is smaller than the MSD from the SO path. Let 
   represent the number of successes for each group. Under the null hypothesis that it is equally likely for either of 
the two predicted paths to result in the smaller MSD in any given game (H0: p=0.5), the probability of observing at 
least    successes (H1: p>0.5) in 30 games is given by (
 
 
)
  
 ∑ (  
 
)      , and the probability of observing at most 
   successes (H1: p<0.5) in 30 games is given by (
 
 
)
  
 ∑ (  
 
)
  
   
.  
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Table 6 – Number of games played by group (Gi) and length of games: Low-uncertainty 
condition 
Length G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 Total 
1 17 13 10 15 8 17 13 19 11 123 
2 4 7 8 6 8 8 8 6 5 60 
3 4 3 4 0 1 1 5 1 4 23 
4 3 1 1 0 2 0 3 1 2 13 
5 0 1 1 4 5 3 0 1 0 15 
6 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 10 
7 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
9 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 1 1 10 
10 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 
Median 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 
Mean 2 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 3 
SD 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 3 2 
 
Table 7 – Mean group requests by period and length of game: Low-uncertainty condition 
Length 
of 
game 
Period within the game 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 569 
(186) 
     
    
2 430 
(101) 
506 
(166) 
     
   
3 464 
(112) 
425 
(73) 
455 
(89) 
    
   
4 394 
(93) 
398 
(105) 
404 
(89) 
447 
(83) 
    
  
5 375 
(114) 
381 
(82) 
384 
(86) 
397 
(69) 
463 
(102) 
   
  
6 372 
(102) 
386 
(64) 
390 
(49) 
398 
(82) 
387 
(73) 
397 
(62) 
   
 
7 358 
(65) 
338 
(60) 
401 
(74) 
405 
(94) 
334 
(56) 
351 
(59) 
461 
(85) 
  
 
8 270 
(0) 
420 
(0) 
320 
(0) 
500 
(0) 
420 
(0) 
370 
(0) 
470 
(0) 
620 
(0) 
  
9 351 
(64) 
373 
(74) 
371 
(56) 
371 
(83) 
342 
(57) 
359 
(73) 
343 
(54) 
329 
(38) 
497 
(105) 
 
10 416 
(67) 
369 
(37) 
350 
(54) 
433 
(59) 
353 
(34) 
405 
(70) 
341 
(55) 
389 
(52) 
376 
(51) 
449 
(141) 
Note: Standard deviation is in parentheses. Games of length 5 and 10 were only observed once. 
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Table 8 – Statistical analysis of differences between observed and predicted values 
Length 
Games 
Variable Coefficient Wald z 
Statistics 
p-value Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
L
en
g
th
=
1
 R
Obs
-R
SPNE
 -18.977 -0.60 0.545 -80.464 42.510 
R
Obs
-R
SO
 299.415 9.54 0.000 237.923 360.902 
∆=
SOObs
SPNEObs
R-R
R-R
 0.063 0.57 0.569 -0.155 0.282 
L
en
g
th
>
1
 R
Obs
-R
SPNE
 -176.841 -9.50 0.000 -213.315 -140.367 
R
Obs
-R
SO
 141.551 7.61 0.000 105.077 178.025 
∆=
SOObs
SPNEObs
R-R
R-R
 1.249 4.22 0.000 0.670 1.829 
Table 9 – Number of games with smallest MSD from the SPNE path 
Group Nº Games Proportion Hypotheses p-value Decision 
1 21 0.700 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.02 Rej. H0 
2 17 0.567 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.292 Do not Rej. H0 
3 11 0.367 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p<0.5 
0.100 Do not Rej. H0 
4 8 0.267 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p<0.5 
0.008 Rej. H0 
5 4 0.133 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p<0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
6 23 0.767 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.003 Rej. H0 
7 30 1.000 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
8 27 0.900 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
<0.001 Rej. H0 
9 15 0.500 
H0: p=0.5 
H1: p>0.5 
0.572 Do not Rej. H0 
Note: The per period mean square deviation (MSD) of requests from predicted requests for each group in each game 
k=1, …, 30, is computed as ∑         
   
  
    
   , where     is the observed group request in period t of game k, 
   
  is the respective prediction (either at the SPNE or SO path), and    is the length of game k. For each group, we 
define a “success” as a game in which the MSD from the SPNE path is smaller than the MSD from the SO path. Let 
   represent the number of successes for each group. Under the null hypothesis that it is equally likely for either of 
the two predicted paths to result in the smaller MSD in any given game (H0: p=0.5), the probability of observing at 
least    successes (H1: p>0.5) in 30 games is given by (
 
 
)
  
 ∑ (  
 
)      , and the probability of observing at most 
   successes (H1: p<0.5) in 30 games is given by (
 
 
)
  
 ∑ (  
 
)
  
   
.  
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Table 10 – Maximum likelihood estimates of treatment effects on destruction probabilities 
Variable Coefficient Wald z Statistics p-value Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI 
A. Length of Games=1 
HIGH 0.1232 4.39 0.000 0.0681 0.1782 
B. Length of Games>1 – First Period Requests 
HIGH 0.1713 6.88 0.000 0.1225 0.2201 
C. Length of Games>1 – Non-First Period Requests 
HIGH 0.1338 8.73 0.000 0.1038 0.1638 
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Figure 1 – Probability of destruction: Predicted (SO, SPNE) and observed values under high-
uncertainty condition 
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Figure 2 – Probability of destruction: Predicted (SO, SPNE) and observed values under low-
uncertainty condition 
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Appendix - Length of games by each group in each uncertainty condition 
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